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Abstract
Legal pluralism calls into question the monop-
oly of the modern state when it comes to the 
production and the enforcement of norms. It rests 
on the assumption that juridical normativity and 
state organization can be dissociated. From an early 
modern historian’s perspective, such an assump-
tion makes perfect sense, the plural nature of the 
legal order being the natural state of affairs in 
imperial spaces across the globe in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries. This article will provide 
a case study of the collaborative nature of the 
interaction between spiritual and temporal legal 
orders in Spain and its overseas territories as 
conceived by Tomás de Mercado (ca. 1520–1575), 
a major theologian from the School of Salamanca. 
His treatise on trade and contracts (1571) con-
tained an extended discussion of the government’s 
attempt to regulate the grain market by imposing a 
maximum price. It will be argued that Mercado’s 
view on the bindingness of economic regulations 
in conscience allowed for the internalization of the 
regulatory power of the nascent state. He called 
upon confessors to be strict enforcers of state law, 
considering them as fathers of the republic as 
much as fathers of faith. This is illustrative of the 
»collaborative form of legal pluralism« typical of 
the osmotic relationship between Church and 
State in the early modern Spanish empire. It con-
tributed to the moral justification of state jurisdic-
tions, while at the same time, guaranteeing a 
privileged role for theologians and religious leaders 
in running the affairs of the state.
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1 Legal Pluralism and the DNA of
Pre-Modern Western Law
Both as an empirical phenomenon and a re-
search agenda, »legal pluralism«1 calls into ques-
tion the monopoly of the modern state on the 
production and the enforcement of norms.2 It rests 
on the assumption, challenged by legal positivists, 
that juridical normativity and state organization 
can be dissociated. From an early modern perspec-
tive, such an assumption makes sense. The plural 
nature of the legal order was the natural state of 
affairs in late medieval Christian Europe and im-
perial spaces across the globe in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries.3 The »parallel sovereignty«4
between the Church of Rome and state powers in 
pre-modern Europe could even be considered the 
DNA of Western legal culture, fostering liberty for 
the individual by stimulating competition between 
jurisdictions.5 The co-existence and interaction of 
different legal orders is at the very heart of medi-
eval and early modern, pre-nineteenth century 
legal cultures in Europe and beyond.6 The 
Church’s normative system, for instance, was un-
ambiguously recognized as a ius, a legal order, 
alongside the legal order of the secular authorities. 
They were both subject to the higher principles 
deriving from the natural legal order. The term 
»legal pluralism«, then, adequately captures the 
pluralistic structure of pre-modern law. This legal 
pluralism stands in marked contrast to the culture 
of »legal monism« or »legal absolutism« conse-
crated by the codification movements in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries.7 Hence the need to 
develop a truly »global legal history« which crosses 
the mental and territorial boundaries that have 
long characterized national legal histories, rooted 
as they were in the desire to combat rival, often 
religious normative systems in order to impose a 
single rule of law within national boundaries.8
Legal pluralism as a heuristic concept, then, 
may actually prove less problematic for the analysis 
of plural legal orders in pre-nineteenth century 
Europe in a global context than in modern states. 
The notion of »non-state law« remains a contra-
diction in terms when considered from a state-
centric perspective on law, especially as developed 
in the Napoleonic tradition of the nineteenth 
century.9 To use Jacques Vanderlinden’s laconic 
words, once a modern state has been established, 
it is theoretically impossible to have more than one 
sovereign law within its boundaries, other norms 
or legal systems being automatically subordinated 
to the superiority of the state law by the mere fact 
of being ignored, tolerated, or recognized on the 
same territory.10 Granted, recent years have seen 
the replacement of the notion of »legal pluralism« 
by looser terms such as »normative pluralism« in 
an attempt to safeguard the specificity of law in 
comparison with other norms while recognizing 
the existence, in practice, of other types of norma-
tivity alongside the sovereign law.11 Even so, the 
pluralistic conception of »law« or »normativity« 
will remain a challenge in a modern societal con-
text, operating as it does in the shadow cast by the 
supreme authority of the nation state, established 
since the nineteenth century. Evidently, it has 
become a futile attempt to escape any reference 
to the primacy of the state, even when analyzing 
alternative normative structures. The term »state-
less law«, for instance, confirms the reference status 
of state law in modern times precisely when 
acknowledging alternative normative phenom-
ena.12
1 Griffiths (1986).
2 Otis (2012) 9.
3 Berman (1983), Prodi (2003), 
Quaglioni (2004), Benton / Ross
(2013).
4 Prodi (2011) 24.
5 Fukuyama (2011) 271.
6 Duve (2016) 5.
7 Grossi (2007).
8 Schmoeckel (2000) nr. 26, Duve
(2016) 2.
9 Halpérin (2009) 3–27.
10 Vanderlinden (2009) 36.
11 Griffiths (2005), cited in Duve
(2016) 13. For a critique of the im-
proper linguistic expansion of the le-
gal domain ensuing from the term 
»legal pluralism«, see Roberts (1998).
12 Merry (2015) 5.
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The interaction within legally pluralistic orders 
should not only be expected to be conflictual. In 
the past, Church and State authorities, the two 
major institutional players, generally supported 
each other’s interests,13 resulting in what we pro-
pose to call a situation of »collaborative legal 
pluralism«. Modern contexts in which »legal plu-
ralism« is studied could easily lead to oblivion of 
that collaborative aspect of the interaction between 
multiple legal orders. Positivist legal scholarship in 
the nineteenth century tried to exclude alternative 
normative orders by representing them as a threat. 
Current studies on legal pluralism have a tendency 
to highlight the antagonistic character of relations 
between state and non-state normativity. Religious 
law in Western democracies and traditional nor-
mative orders in former colonial states, in partic-
ular, are frequently perceived as a menace, for 
instance to the modern state’s monopoly on con-
flict resolution or its commitment to human 
rights.14 It is true that in pre-modern times, secular 
and religious authorities did compete for power, 
also leading to conflict, but historians such as Paolo 
Prodi have emphasized that, overall, the interac-
tion between them should be primarily under-
stood in terms of an »osmotic relationship«, result-
ing in collaboration rather than opposition.15 Seen 
from a global comparative law perspective, the 
»intimate links« between temporal and spiritual 
power structures appear to be a typical feature of 
the Western legal tradition.16 Gunnar Folke 
Schuppert has even employed the term »practiced 
partnership« to denote Church-State relationships 
in the ancient régime.17 The Church frequently 
invoked the secular arm of temporal jurisdiction,18
while justifying the state’s jurisdiction in moral 
and religious terms. Even in Protestant territories, 
where the Roman-Catholic Church’s institutions 
collapsed, religious pastors continued to play a 
fundamental role in the enforcement of state law 
and authority, while the state itself incorporated 
values and norms from the Christian faith in its 
policies and laws.19 The complementary tasks of 
governing souls and governing citizens went hand 
in hand, without excluding friction.20 That fric-
tion did, indeed, exist, and it transpired in endless 
disputes over the boundaries of jurisdictional com-
petence.21 Yet, As Patrick Glenn aptly observed, 
the jurists of the time, whether canon lawyers or 
civil lawyers, coped with a variety of sometimes 
contradictory laws, »with no means of definitive 
inclusion or exclusion«.22
2 Economic Regulation and Theology
in Early Modern Spain
The historical material used in this case study of 
»collaborative legal pluralism« comes from six-
teenth century Spain, where growing state power 
saw a concomitant rise in market regulation, espe-
cially by means of the official establishment of the 
grain price. The regulation of the grain price 
became a central issue for early modern princes 
since it was one of the main instruments to expand 
and consolidate political power.23 To protect Span-
ish consumers against rising prices, caused by bad 
harvests and low productivity in arable farming, a 
maximum price for grain, the so-called tasa del 
trigo, was introduced in 1502 by Ferdinand and 
Isabelle and re-adopted by Charles V in 1539. King 
Philip II released a new regulation on the tasa del 
trigo in March 1558, which was eventually included 
in book 5, title 25 of the Nueva Recopilación (1567). 
As a result, the maximum prize for grain became 
permanent, alleviating consumers, but aggravating 
the fate of poor farmers.24 The mixed effects of the 
tasa del trigo only added to the protracted debate 
about the bindingness of such price regulations in 
conscience.25 In his decree about the tasa del trigo, 
Philip II warned citizens that his regulation was 
not only binding in the civil courts, but also in the 
13 For the early modern Spanish case, 
see Rouco-Varela (1965) 126–149 
(The State serving the Church) and 
(significantly more voluminous) 
150–296 (The Church serving the 
State), also cited in Decock (2013a) 
625.
14 Tamanaha (2015).
15 Prodi (2003) 112, 283.
16 Menski (2006) 145.
17 Schuppert (2014) 262–284.
18 Helmholz (1996) 339–365.
19 Schmoeckel (2014) 308.
20 Leveleux-Texeira / Peters-Custot
(2016) 13.
21 For the early modern Spanish case, 
see Rodríguez Arrocha (2016) 
149–157.
22 Glenn (2013) 41.
23 Prodi (2009) 328.
24 DelVigo Gutiérrez (2006) 183.
25 Gómez Camacho (1998) 187–205.
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court of conscience, on pain of eternal damnation 
of the soul.26 As a matter of fact, the bindingness of 
price regulations in conscience became one of the 
central issues debated by jurists and theologians in 
the early modern period.27 It provides us with a 
fine example of the interaction between the differ-
ent legal orders in early modern Spain.
If the civil law was in the hands of the Spanish 
Crown, the guardians of the law of conscience 
were theologians such as Tomás de Mercado (c. 
1520–1575).28 Mercado entered the religious order 
of the Dominicans and was active in both main-
land and New Spain (Mexico). He belonged to the 
same religious order as Francisco de Vitoria (1483/
92–1546) and Domingo de Soto (1494–1560), the 
famous theologians promoting the revival of 
Thomism at the University of Salamanca in the 
first half of the sixteenth century. Mercado made 
a significant contribution to spreading the neo-
Thomist tradition in the New World, especially 
through his Suma de tratos y contratos, a manual on 
trade and contracts written at the request of mer-
chants in Sevilla in 1569.29 While the legal notion 
of conscience as a special jurisdiction will be 
further detailed in the next section, it is worth-
while recalling that it is no surprise to find theo-
logians such as Mercado discussing economic is-
sues in early modern Spain. Spanish scholastic 
theologians are well known for having responded 
to some of the most pressing social, political and 
economic needs of their time.30 Drawing upon 
medieval scholastic economics,31 but adapting it to 
the new times, they refined the normative, con-
tractual framework to deal with challenges such as 
the rise of global trade and international financial 
networks.32 The issue of price regulation, in par-
ticular, attracted attention from dozens of theolo-
gians, as meticulous research by Abelardo Del Vigo 
Gutiérrez has revealed.33 They universally agreed 
that specific circumstances can allow the prince to 
establish a legal price of certain goods, binding on 
pain of sin, for the sake of the public good;34
however, they disagreed about the desirability of 
price-fixing and the severity of the obligation in 
conscience.
A major concern for Mercado in his discussion 
on maximum prices was to rebuke the misconcep-
tion that the tasa del trigo had only limited effect in 
conscience. In fact, the second edition of his 
influential Suma de tratos y contratos, published at 
Seville in 1571, contained an extra book, offering 
a more extended treatment of the tasa del trigo
than the original edition of 1569.35 As Mercado 
explained in the new book on the legal grain price 
in the second edition of his Suma, one of the main 
reasons that pushed him to revise his original 
treatise was to combat the contrary ideas dissemi-
nated in the meantime by the Declaración de la 
pragmática del trigo cuanto al foro interior del almo. It 
contained a declaration on the limited bindingness 
of the maximum price in the »internal court of the 
soul«, granting moral approval to small deviations 
from the legal grain price. The Declaration was 
probably composed by Mexía, a Spanish jurist of 
whom little is known.36 Mercado, on the contrary, 
insisted that human laws strictly bind in con-
science if they are just and necessary for good 
governance, regardless of whether the violation is 
small or grave.37 Nobody offends God by selling 
grain above the legal grain price before it is fixed, 
Mercado explained, but once a legal grain price has 
been established for the sake of the public good, it 
is entirely binding in conscience. Moreover, if 
regulating the market is necessary for the tranquil-
26 Nueva Recopilación (ed. Madrid, 
Zuñiga, 1745, online available on 
Google Books), vol. 1, lib. 5, tit. 25, 
l. 4, nr. 7, p. 832, see also Casey
(1999) 57 and García Sanz (1998) 26.
27 Prodi (2012) 172.
28 See new insights on the birth date of 
Mercado by Lagares Calvo (2016).
29 Duve (2012) 36–37.
30 Duve (2015) 123–137, Decock
(2016a) 267–268, including refer-
ences to further literature.
31 Langholm (1998), Todeschini
(2004), Piron (2012) 11–26.
32 Prodi (2009), Koskenniemi (2011), 
Duve (2015), Decock (2016b).
33 DelVigo Gutiérrez (1981).
34 De Roover (1955) 186, Gordley
(1991) 98, Chafuen (2003) 140.
35 For this reason, the facsimile of the 
1569-edition Tratos y contratos de mer-
caderes y tratantes published in 2015 
by the University of Salamanca can-
not be used here. The third book of 
the Suma de tratos y contratos, dedi-
cated to the tasa del trigo, is also lack-
ing in the Madrid 1975 edition by 
Restituto Sierra Bravo. The textual 
basis for this contribution is the 
Madrid 1977 facsimile of the Seville 
1571-edition edited by Nicolás Sán-
chez-Albornoz, as available online at 
http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/nd/
ark:/59851/bmc1c1t9 (unpaginated, 
last consulted on 14 April 2017).
36 De Dios (2014) 416–417.
37 Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 
lib. 3, cap. 9: »Esta obediencia legal 
no solamente se ha de tener a la ley 
humana cuando contiene y encierra 
en sí algún precepto natural o divino, 
sino también cuando manda alguna 
cosa meramente seglar y profana. Si es 




ity and the peace of the kingdom (estado tranquilo y 
quieto del reino), the prince not only has the author-
ity to impose maximum prices, he is even under an 
obligation to do so, on pain of sin.38
In this exposition on the maximum grain price, 
Mercado turns out to be a strong advocate of moral 
control and government interference with mar-
kets.39 He shared the view of his colleague Dom-
ingo de Soto that, in an ideal world, all prices 
should be established by the prince for the sake of 
the public interest.40 In those Dominican theolo-
gians’ view, princes were to be trusted more than 
merchants. The desire of merchants is to buy low 
and sell high, according to Mercado, while the 
commonwealth wants traders to sell as low as 
possible for the sake of the public good.41 Mercado 
was wary about individuals’ tendency to seek their 
own advantage at the expense of their neighbor. 
Convinced, in true Augustinian fashion, that man-
kind had been profoundly corrupted by original 
sin, he insisted that freedom of contract should be 
restrained by laws, binding the individual will with 
many ropes.42 Moreover, he was driven by pro-
found nationalist and protectionist instincts. A 
merchant should look to the interest of the nation 
first, then to the interest of the poor, and only in 
the last place to the interest of his family.43 He 
resented foreign merchants, inclined as they were – 
in his view – to favor their own national interest, 
promote their own cultural values, and neglect the 
interests of their hosts.44 As a substitute to foreign 
traders, Mercado recommended public authorities 
to appoint a handful of merchants responsible for 
importing and exporting goods.45 They should be 
paid a moderate salary by the public treasure, just 
like state officials.
While usually labeled as forerunners of Adam 
Smith’s economic liberalism,46 not all theologians 
working in the tradition of the School of Salaman-
ca were as clearly in favor of free markets at that 
time, as some of their later followers, such as the 
Jesuits Luis de Molina (1535–1600), Leonardus 
Lessius (1554–1623) and Juan de Lugo (1583–
1660).47 It may be recalled, though, that the almost 
unconditional theological endorsement by Merca-
do of legal prices contrasts with the much more 
critical attitude towards price regulation that can 
be found in the writings of those Jesuit theolo-
gians. For example, Molina did not doubt that legal 
prices were binding in conscience. He also did not 
question the necessity to regulate economic life by 
stimulating moral virtue.48 But he was much more 
skeptical about the presumed usefulness of govern-
ment intervention in markets, fearing negative 
side-effects such as corruption, rent-seeking, and 
favoritism. He required more severe conditions for 
a legal price to produce the strictest of obligations 
in conscience, lending precedence to the natural 
justice of the competitive market price instead.49 If 
merchants did not observe the legal price, because 
it was clearly violating the natural just price, they 
were not bound in conscience to make restitution, 
according to Molina. Yet, he recognized that even 
under such circumstances citizens would never-
38 Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 
lib. 3, cap. 9: »Y aun a las veces son 
estas tales tan necesarias al estado 
tranquilo y quieto del reino que no 
solamente tiene autoridad para man-
darlas sino también obligación, y pe-
caría en no mandarlas, según la ne-
cesidad común las pide.«
39 Botero Bernal (2003).
40 Popescu (1997) 39–40.
41 Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 
lib. 2, cap. 6: »El deseo del mercader 
es el universal de todos, aunque, co-
mo dice San Agustín, es, con toda su 
generalidad,vicioso, conviene a saber: 
querer mercar barato y vender caro. 
(…) El intento y deseo de la república 
es, al contrario, que se venda lo más 
barato que se pudiere, porque le per-
tenece promover toda la utilidad y 
provecho a los vecinos.«
42 Decock (2013a) 523.
43 Beuchot / Iñiguez (1990) 29.
44 Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 
lib. 2, cap. 6: »Mas, si son de fuera, 
mayormente de otro reinos, es admi-
tirlos destruir y disipar toda su pros-
peridad y meter unos públicos des-
pojadores de su riqueza y abundancia 
y aun unos labradores o sembradores 
de abusos y vicios, porque todo 
hombre desea naturalmente honrar y 
ennoblecer su patria y procurar de 
pasar a ella todo el bien y tesoro que a 
esta pueda coger y despojar; y lo mis-
mo hacen los de aquí cuando están 
allá. Demás de esto, como se aman y 
agradan tanto las costumbres, usos, 
ritos y trajes en cada uno se cría, en 
cualquier parte que va las quiere in-
jerir y plantar y las predica y persuade, 
y, como el vulgo es tan antojadizo y 
novelero, al momento las imite y re-
cibe; las cuales muchas veces son de 
suyo dañosas y corruptas, y, si no lo 
son, a lo menos no convienen a esta 
tierra como a la suya.«
45 Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 
lib. 2, cap. 6: »Negocio sería, si alguna 
ciudad lo hiciese – negocioso y tra-
bajoso, yo lo confieso, mas sería jun-
tamente tan provechoso que el gran 
provecho fuese paga y recompensa del 
poco trabajo- dar a dos o cuatro la 
misma república el dinero con que 
traigan lo necesario, señalándoles por 
su factoría un tanto, y no dandoles el 
caudal, sino que ellos lo pusiesen, 
concederles una moderada ganancia 
que fuese a todos leve y facíl.«
46 E. g. Kuchar (2016) 131.
47 Rothbard (2006) 97–133.
48 Alonso-Lasheras (2011) 185.
49 Schüssler (2014) 269–272.
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theless sin against their duty, as a matter of con-
science, to obey the prince (obedientia principis) and 
show charity towards the nation and the neighbors 
(caritas patriae et proximorum).50
3 Cooperating Jurisdictions: The Confessor
as a Law Enforcer
Jurisdictional multiplicity or »jurisdictional 
pluralism« is a central aspect of the plural legal 
order characteristic of early modern imperial 
spaces.51 The notion of »jurisdictional pluralism« 
seems especially appropriate for analyzing the em-
pirical case study at hand. The bindingness of 
economic regulations in conscience does not just 
bring into play the interaction between two differ-
ent sets of laws – positive human law produced by 
the Spanish Crown, on the one hand, and the 
natural and divine laws as explicated by theolo-
gians, on the other. More importantly, it brings up 
the question of how two distinct jurisdictions were 
interacting, or at least expected to interact, in 
sixteenth-century Spain and its colonies. Theolo-
gians and jurists did not merely debate the bind-
ingness of price regulations in conscience in terms 
of the theoretical interaction between different sets 
of laws, but rather investigated its practical con-
sequences for judicial practice and issues of juris-
dictional competence. The prevalence of those 
jurisdictional aspects is manifest in their discus-
sions about whether clergymen were obliged to 
observe the tasa del trigo, benefitting as they were 
from several privileges that exempted them from 
the Crown’s jurisdiction, such as the right to be 
judged by their peers or not to be taxed. Regardless 
of those jurisdictional privileges, which were 
merely meant to safeguard the dignity of their 
status, according to Mercado,52 all clergymen, 
including bishops, are subject to observe the max-
imum grain price in conscience, since the legal 
price is a just price according to natural law.53 The 
tasa del trigo is not just a regulation imposed by 
the king, but also a divine and natural law (no es 
solamente ley del rey sino ley divina y natural), which 
binds everybody in conscience.
The controversy surrounding the tasa del trigo
was as much a case of co-existence between differ-
ent jurisdictions, at that time, as it was about legal 
pluralism in the sense of the co-existence of differ-
ent laws. This reasoning must be taken even one 
step further. Apart from the dual relationship 
between ecclesiastical and civil jurisdictions, it is 
necessary to acknowledge that within the Church’s 
jurisdiction a further division emerged between 
the so-called external ecclesiastical jurisdiction and 
the sacramental jurisdiction of the interior or the 
soul (forum conscientiae).54 In other words, the 
question of the moral bindingness of the tasa del 
trigo is also a question about the enforcement of a 
regulation laid down by the Crown in a jurisdic-
tion other than that of the civil or ecclesiastical 
courts, namely the court of conscience.The judicial 
character of conscience in the late medieval and 
early modern Catholic world is a highly relevant 
fact that has, nevertheless, persistently escaped 
anachronistic readings of moral theological writ-
ings.55 The current predominance of the subjective 
understanding of conscience, not in the least as a 
result of the Lutheran Reformation, has obscured 
the profoundly objective and jurisdictional charac-
ter of the notion of conscience that forms the 
50 Luis deMolina, De iustitia et iure,vol. 
2: De contractibus, Mainz, 1602, tract. 
2, disp. 365, col. 478, lit. c: »Esto in 
principe essete potestas ad conden-
dam eam legem in publicum bonum, 
lexque illa vim obligandi haberet, 
nihilominus transgressores illius, 
quamvis peccarent, ad nullam tamen 
restitutionem tenerentur. Ratio au-
tem est, quoniam ea lex non consti-
tueret iustum commutativum, quod 
in aequalitate quoad valorem inter 
rem et pretium consistit, sed solum 
licite praeciperet frumentum eo pre-
tio vendi in commune bonum, quare 
transgredientes eam legem peccarent 
quidem contra obedientiam principis 
et forte contra caritatem patriae ac 
proximorum, posita praesertim ea 
lege, non tamen contra iustitiam, et 
idcirco ad restitutionem non tene-
rentur.«
51 Benton / Ross (2013), also cited in
Duve (2016) 5 and 13.
52 Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 
lib. 3, cap. 3: »Y todos afirman que el 
papa y los príncipes los exentaron 
solamente de lo que era indecente a su 
estado o les concedieron lo que era 
decoro y hermosura, como en tener 
sus jueces por sí, en no dar tributos y 
pechos, ni otros servicios reales o 
personales, porqué mas libres pudie-
sen ocuparse en el culto divino y en 
apacentar el pueblo con pasto espiri-
tual. Mas a las leyes do se manda 
algún acto necesario, no repugnante, 
antes muy decente a su estado, igual-
mente están sujetos con los seglares.«
53 Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 
lib. 2, cap. 6, lib. 3, cap. 2, lib. 3, 
cap. 3.
54 Prodi (2012) 167–169.
55 For legitimate warnings against the 
oblivion of the objective character of 
conscience in Catholic moral theo-
logical, legal, and political writings 
of the early modern period, see
Prosperi (2001) 175, Reinhardt
(2016) 2, Maihold (2017) 61.
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background to scholastic moral theologians’ writ-
ings in the early modern period.56
Luther’s allegedly subjectivist understanding of 
conscience was taken as the perfect foil by the 
Council of Trent (1545–1563), urging the Fathers 
of the Council to affirm the juridical conception of 
conscience. While the confessor’s role in the sacra-
ment of penance had traditionally been described 
as threefold (father, doctor, judge), the judicial role 
now became predominant.57 In order to confess 
his sins, the penitent presented himself as the 
defendant in a jurisdictional space specially created 
for the enforcement of norms in the wake of Trent 
– the confessional or sacred tribunal of penance58 – 
where his own conscience acted as the accuser and 
the confessor as a judge.59 As the Roman Cate-
chism incorporating the doctrine of Trent empha-
sized – in line with traditional teaching going back 
to Saint Augustine and Gratian’s Decretum – the 
confessor could not absolve the penitent unless 
restitution60 was made of the harm caused by him 
(e. g. by selling above the legal price, by not ful-
filling a contract, by charging excessive interest 
rates, by ruining somebody’s reputation, by muti-
lating the victim’s body).61 Upon absolution, the 
penitent was regularly asked to perform acts of 
satisfaction such as fasting, praying and works of 
mercy.62
Martin Luther’s proposed shielding of individ-
ual conscience from outside regulation by positive, 
particularly ecclesiastical law and against control 
by clerics was seen by Catholic jurists and theolo-
gians as a fundamental menace to the public 
order.63 The main objective of early modern Cath-
olic theologians was to oppose just that. They 
insisted that conscience falls under the jurisdiction 
of a confessor who is able to establish objectively 
what laws bind the individual.64 Mercado’s em-
phasis on the moral bindingness of the tasa del 
trigo, formulated in his Suma less than a decade 
after the conclusion of the Council of Trent, 
immediately taps into that context. »It is such a 
well-established truth that preceptive [imperial and 
civil] laws, which are the rules of our operations, 
are binding the subjects [in conscience],« Mercado 
explained,65 »that it is almost a matter of faith, as 
the Catholic Church establishes and teaches in the 
Council of Constance, sessions 8 and 15 against 
Wycliff, and Pope Leo X in his condemnation of 
Luther (who said the opposite), article 20, and the 
Council of Trent.« In other words, denying the 
moral bindingness of the legal grain price did not 
suit a good Catholic. In the eyes of Mercado, it 
raised suspicions of sympathies with heretics such 
as John Wycliff or Martin Luther.
The confessor’s role as a judge in the forum of 
conscience, granting absolution and imposing acts 
of penance through a proper judicial act (actus 
judicialis),66 was considered a crucial policy instru-
ment to guarantee the discipline of the Christian 
faithful and the stability of the Christian political 
order.67 Claiming authority from Aristotle, Merca-
do admonished that a well-ordered republic rests 
on both good laws and wise judges to enforce those 
laws, mentioning civil laws and civil courts, on the 
one hand, and divine laws and conscience, on the 
other. In this manner, Mercado recalled not only 
the plurality of the legal order, but also the fact that 
56 Decock (2013a) 69–86, including 
references to further literature.
57 O’Malley (2013) 153.
58 Schlombs (1965).
59 Dürr (2013) 223.
60 Jansen (2013).
61 Catechismus Romanus (1566), cap. 5, 
num. 78.
62 Catechismus Romanus (1566), cap. 5, 
num. 74.
63 See the worries about the collapse of 
political stability, ascribed to Luther’s 
allegedly dangerous idea of evangel-
ical liberty, expressed in Pope Adrian 
of Utrecht’s letter to Cardinal Chie-
regati, cited in Decock (2013b) 583.
64 González Polvillo (2010) 251–255.
65 Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 
lib. 2, cap. 6: »Bien se haber gran 
cuestión entre teólogos en cómo y 
cuándo obligan en conciencia las 
leyes imperiales y civiles, al menos los 
penales. Mas las perceptivas, que son 
regla de nuestras operaciones, es ver-
dad tan cierta obligar a los vasallos 
que casi es de fe, como lo determina y 
enseña la Iglesia católica en el concilio 
constanciense, sesión 8 y sesión 15 
contra Unicleph, y León X, en la 
condemnación del Lutero (que decía 
lo contrario), artículo 20, y el concilio 
tridentino.«
66 Council of Trent, session 14 (25 No-
vember 1551), canon 9, available on-
line at https://history.hanover.edu/
texts/trent/ct14/html.
67 Prosperi (2001) 186.
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conscience should be considered as a tribunal (foro 
y audiencia).68 »The confessor is to Christianity 
what a prince is to a city,« Mercado explained,69
»it is his task to make sure that all live in order and 
that the law is being observed and executed. He 
collaborates with the penitents to make sure that 
they observe the law which they proclaimed at the 
moment of baptism since confessors are judges of 
conscience (jueces de la conciencia).« Mercado went 
on to sing the praises of confessors and their noble 
mission of guaranteeing the Christian order by 
using their power to enforce the divine law as 
proclaimed by the preachers. Confessors could 
sanction the wicked, threatening them with dam-
nation of their souls. »The confessor compells and 
forces with his power,« Mercado explained, »just 
like a true judge«.70
Confessors contribute to much more than just 
the enforcement of Christian virtues. They have a 
fundamental role to play in enforcing obedience to 
the temporal authorities. Obedience is a central 
theme developed by Mercado throughout the sec-
ond and third books of his Suma de tratos y contra-
tos. Prelates and confessors embody the ecclesias-
tical jurisdiction (jurisdicción) that Christ gave to 
his Church for the sake not only of the spiritual, 
but also of the temporal government of all people 
since he knew that human authorities alone would 
be insufficient.71 The Church’s jurisdiction is es-
sential in guaranteeing obedience to the civil 
authorities, the sacrament of penance being a 
divine remedy to ensure obedience.72 Imperial 
and royal laws should be observed not only out 
of fear of punishment but also for the preservation 
of conscience.73 »One of the great tasks of the 
confessor,« Mercado explicated,74 »is to make the 
penitent understand how important it is for salva-
tion that subjects obey their princes.« The duty to 
obey the prince is entirely natural since political 
power is a divine gift to mankind to provide for the 
well-being of the commonwealth. The authorities 
decide what is necessary for good governance 
according to particular circumstances. Establishing 
legal prices is part of that jurisdictional power 
(jurisdicción) that republics have and to which 
citizens must obey.75 Through their regulatory 
power, political authorities have the task of filling 
the gaps left by nature, whose vicar they are (la 
potestad pública es su vicario). The establishment of 
just prices is just one such gap. In Mercado’s eyes, a 
regulation laid down by the secular authorities is a 
gift from Heaven (viene del Cielo) inasmuch as it 
takes the place of natural law. Once it has been 
established by the political authorities, the obser-
68 Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 
lib. 2, cap. 7: »La raíz y razón funda-
mental de esta doctrina es que de dos 
cosas esenciales a cualquier república, 
como son leyes que se guarden y juez 
y cabeza que la haga cumplir y guar-
dar, la ley más provechosa y substan-
cial entre cuantas ha habido o pudo 
haber, aun para una vida común de 
ciudad, fue y es siempre la divina, y el 
foro y audiencia más necesario el de la 
conciencia y penitencia.«
69 Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 
lib. 2, cap. 7: »Es el confesor en la 
cristiandad como el príncipe en la 
ciudad, a quien incumbe procurar 
que todos vivan en orden y se cumpla 
y ejecute el derecho. Así el confesor 
trabaja con los penitentes que guar-
den la ley que profesaron en el bau-
tismo, porque son jueces de la con-
ciencia.«
70 Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 
lib. 2, cap. 7: »El predicador pude 
aconsejar y persuadir la virtud, mas el 
confesor puede compeler y forzar a 
guardarla, so pena de la vida y cauti-
verio del alma, que es no absolverle. 
Hace lo que el predicador: aconseja, 
persuade y más en particular y con 
mayor claridad y libertad, condi-
ciones importantes para ser de efecto 
el consejo; y mas, necesita y fuerza 
con su potestad como verdadero 
juez.«
71 Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 
lib. 2, cap. 7: »A cuya causa, enten-
diendo nuestro Redentor que se había 
de extender su Iglesia y fe por todas las 
gentes y naciones, instituyó para el 
gobierno de todas la potestad juris-
dicción eclesiástica, que está en pre-
lados y confesores, sabiendo que la 
humana por sí para todos no basta.«
72 Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 
lib. 2, cap. 7: »Y es tan menester para 
que se viva en quietud y sujeción 
tener enfrenada y temer la conciencia, 
que la gente que no la teme está muy 
presta para no obedecer a sus supe-
riores. Así que les es a los goberna-
dores del pueblo importante este 
sacramento para consequir su fin e 
intento, que es la obediencia y vida 
pacifica de los ciudadanos, lo cual, sin 
este medio y remedio divino, no pu-
dieran alcanzar, ni pudieran averi-
guarse con tantos, regiéndolos por 
largo tiempo en justicia, equidad y 
blandura.«
73 Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 
lib. 3, cap. 3: »Debemos obedecer a 
las leyes imperiales o reales no sólo 
por el temor de la pena allí explicada, 
sino por la conciencia.«
74 Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 
lib. 2, cap. 7: »Que uno de los grandes 
cargos que tiene el confesor es dar a 
entender al penitente cuánto importa 
a nuestra salvación obedecer los va-
sallos a sus príncipes (…).«
75 Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 
lib. 3, cap. 5: »Esto es su autoridad y 
jurisdicción y esto hace la obediencia 
que con tanto derecho se le debe.«
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vation of the legal price becomes a dictate of 
reason, obligatory by nature itself rather than 
positive laws.76
Confessors are necessary for the well-being of 
the republic since they make sure that Christian 
citizens obey the prince. Through their judicial 
power in the court of conscience, they compel 
penitents to observe not only the divine law re-
vealed in the Gospel but also the civil laws issued 
by the prince. For that reason, confessors should 
not indulge in laxism, certainly not when faced 
with merchants complaining about over-regula-
tion.77 Mercado required confessors to enforce 
the laws in the strictest of ways, especially by not 
tolerating the slightest deviation from the maxi-
mum grain price.78 Through their power in the 
internal court of conscience, confessors are seminal 
in ensuring also the external respect for justice (la 
observancia exterior de justicia) and in laying the 
foundations of the political life and order (orden y 
vida política).79 They foster a culture of reconcilia-
tion and even help to collect a debt that can no 
longer be recovered through the external court for 
lack of proof.80 »Fathers confessors,« Mercado 
concluded, »are very much fathers of the republic 
(padres confesores muy padres de la república).«81
Therefore, he strongly advised princes to involve 
confessors in the temporal government of the 
republic, quoting Antonio de Mendoza (1496–
1552), first viceroy of Mexico, allegedly saying that 
for good governance of the republic nothing is 
more indispensable than good confessors.82
4 Collaborative Legal Pluralism and the 
Internalization of State Law
The tenet that confessors are not just »fathers-
priests« but also »fathers of the republic« perfectly 
sums up the convergence of political and religious 
interests strived for by Mercado in the plural legal 
universe of the sixteenth-century Spanish empire. 
Civil laws as much as divine laws should be 
enforced by confessors considered as real judges 
in the tribunal of conscience. The binary, often 
conflicting logic of Church-State relationships in 
the modern period does not contribute to under-
standing Mercado’s collaborative vision of the 
interaction between ecclesiastical and temporal 
jurisdictions. Instead, this interaction must be 
understood in terms of an »osmotic relationship« 
(Prodi), a »practiced partnership« (Schuppert) or 
»intimate links« (Menski). Modern notions of law 
and morality do not improve our understanding of 
the early modern jurisdictional complexity either. 
For modern jurists, the coercive power of the state 
makes the difference between »the pious hopes of 
morality and the grim certitudes of law,« to quote 
Michael Barkun’s description of the positivistic 
creed.83 For early modern governors such as Anto-
76 Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 
lib. 2, cap. 6: »Demás de esto, certísi-
mo es que todos están obligados a 
vender cada cosa por lo que vale. Esto 
es un dictamen natural de la razón, 
que, sin doctor ninguno ni ley posi-
tiva, lo enseña a todas las naciones.«
77 Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 
lib. 2, cap. 7: »Quéjanse los merca-
deres que les pone la república mu-
chas leyes y les tasa tan corto la ropa 
que perderían del costo si la guarda-
sen. Y algunos confesores hay tan 
blandos que, informados de ello, pa-
san de ligero con el pecado y los 
absuelven. Cierto, a mi juicio, yerran 
ambos, y por ventura más gravamente 
el confesor en no reprehendérselo 
con aspereza y negarles la absolución 
con severidad si no se enmiendan, 
que el penitente en pecar.«
78 Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 
lib. 2 and lib. 3, passim, see also Casey
(1999) 57.
79 Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 
lib. 2, cap. 7: »(…) cosa importantísi-
ma aun para la observancia exterior 
de justicia, porque remedian muchos 
daños, deshacen grandes agravios 
imposibilitados a deshacerse por otra 
vía, impiden no pocos males, son 
causa continuamente de bien, no sólo 
espiritual sino común y corporal. Las 
deudas, que no se pueden averiguar 
en juicio, las hacen restituir; la fama, 
que aun no sabía el otro quién se la 
había quitado y robado, se la hacen 
volver, haciendo al murmurador se 
desdiga; los que mal se quieren mu-
cho, los apartan; los mal apartados 
conciertan; reconcilian los discordes; 
arrancan los rencores; apagan el fuego 
y afición; reprehenden los vicios, 
plantan virtudes, cualidades y medios 
sumamente requisitos, aun para un 
orden y vida política.«
80 Interesting, in this regard, is Merca-
do’s quotation of Saint Paul to the 
effect that God does not want man to 
enter heaven as long as he is bound by 
outstanding debt. Mercado, Suma de 
tratos y contratos, lib. 3, cap. 9: »no 
quiere Dios que entre en el cielo 
hombre adeudado, sin libre de dé-
bitos«.
81 Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 
lib. 2, cap. 7.
82 Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 
lib. 2, cap. 7: »Para el buen gobierno 
temporal de la república no hay cosa 
que más se requiera y aproveche que 
buenos confesores«. Mendoza is fa-
mous for relying on the clergy in 
running New Spain, requiring the 
clergy to live by the highest standards 
of discipline, see Aiton (1927) 
104–105.
83 Decock (2013a) 86.
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nio de Mendoza, however, it was obvious that 
conscience, as a tribunal, made the difference 
between the aspirations of civil law and its enforce-
ment in practice. The confessional created a sacra-
mental-legal space for the internalization and the 
implementation not only of divine but also of civil 
laws.
At the end of his exposition on the legitimacy of 
the Pragmática del trigo, Mercado developed a short 
theory about the unity of the law of the land and 
the law of conscience, which is typical of what has 
been called the »anti-penalist« current in scholastic 
political thought.84 As the name indicates, »anti-
penalism« reacts against the »purely penal law 
theory«. This theory holds that some laws are 
merely of a penal nature, viz. they just prescribe a 
punishment for a certain action. The violation of 
such merely penal laws does not constitute a sin in 
the court of conscience.85 In his work De potestate 
legis poenalis (1550), on the power of the penal law, 
the Franciscan theologian Alfonso de Castro 
(1495–1558) had recognized that such laws, how-
ever exceptional, could exist.86 But following 
Domingo de Soto and the majority of Catholic 
theologians in his day, Mercado rejected the purely 
penal law theory.87 For the sake of the peace and 
the tranquility of the republic (pax et tranquillitas 
reipublicae), they argued that crime and sin are 
inseparable, thus contributing to the internaliza-
tion of positive law and the sacralization of the 
nascent state. Violating a just law does not only 
constitute a crime, but it is also a sin that will be 
venial or mortal according to the gravity of the 
matter.88 The theologians, then, considerably con-
tributed to the moral legitimation of the rise of the 
modern state, which heavily drew on the rhetoric 
of »peace and the tranquility of the republic.«89 It 
is not a coincidence that Mercado’s exposition on 
the moral bindingness of the legal grain price 
abounds with references to the argument of »peace 
and tranquility of the republic« (quietud y paz 
pública / quietud del pueblo / páz de la república / 
el estado tranquilo y quieto del reino etc.) as neces-
sitating absolute obedience to the prince in con-
science.90
Mercado’s plea in favor of mutual jurisdictional 
collaboration between spiritual and temporal au-
thorities was not new, but rather a strong re-
affirmation of traditional Catholic theology of 
law and politics.91 Like much of early modern 
scholastic political doctrine, it was aimed at the 
restoration of the medieval dream of a Christian 
commonwealth.92 In the spirit of the Council of 
Trent and the neo-scholastic revival movement at 
Salamanca, Mercado re-affirmed the basic princi-
ple of Thomistic political theology that just laws, 
issued for the sake of the common good, are 
binding in conscience.93 Drawing on a famous 
passage in Saint Paul’s letter to the Romans, 
explaining that all power comes from God,94
Mercado insisted that resisting legitimate power 
was tantamount to resisting the divine order.95
Fearing the disruptive potential of Martin Luther’s 
idea of evangelical liberty, or, for that matter, Jean 
Gerson and Jacques Almain’s doctrine of merely 
penal laws,96 all authors mentioned in Mercado’s 
exposition on the tasa del trigo, he considered the 
view that civil laws are not binding in conscience as 
heretical. The background to his advocacy of a 
system of collaborative legal pluralism was as much 
driven by the contemporary concern about the 
Lutheran heresy, then, as it was by the need to 
84 DelVigo Gutiérrez (2006) 581, 
584–585, 589.
85 Daniel (1968) 38.
86 Condorelli (2012) 91.
87 Contreras (2016) 94–99.
88 Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 
lib. 3, cap. 10: »Todas las leyes (…) 
siendo justas, obligan en conciencia a 
su observancia, más o menos, esto es o 
debajo de mortal o venial, según la 
gravedad y peso de su materia y con-
forme a la necesidad que hay de 
guardarse (…).«
89 Simon (2004) 218–225.
90 For example, Mercado, Suma de tra-
tos y contratos, lib. 3, cap. 1, lib. 3, 
cap. 7, lib. 3, cap. 9, lib. 3, cap. 10.
91 Condorelli (2012) 56.
92 Meccarelli (2014) 130.
93 Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 
lib. 3, cap. 9: »Cuando las leyes civiles 
imperiales o reales son justas, con las 
condiciones que su equidad deman-
da, hechas por la utilidad universal de 
todos, de cosas graves y necesarias, 
obligan en conciencia, y quebrantar-
las es ofender a Dios, cuya voluntad es 
se obedezcan los ministros de su jus-
ticia que, en su lugar, en diversos 
reinos presiden.«
94 Rom. 13:1, also discussed by Do-
mingo de Soto and many other 
scholastic theologians, see Decock
(2015) 328.
95 Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 
lib. 3, cap. 9: »Conforme a esto, sin 
discrepar punto, es lo que dice San 
Panblo escribiendo a los romanos: 
Toda ánima está sujeta a las potestades 
mayores, esto es, a los príncipes y 
reyes, porque no hay potestad sino de 
Dios, y las cosas que Dios hace, todas 
son rectas y justas. Así que quien 
resiste a la potestad, resiste a la orde-
nación divina.«
96 Daniel (1968) 23.
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back up the Spanish imperial endeavor with reli-
gious legitimation. Contrary to Luther, the Cath-
olic theologians saw conscience primarily as the 
locus for the internalization of human laws, not as 
a bulwark of resistance for the autonomous indi-
vidual against them.97
As is clear from the above exposition, Mercado 
was in favor of strong government intervention in 
the economy, advocating strict enforcement of 
Philip II’s ordinance about the tasa del trigo in 
the court of conscience. True to the spirit of 
scholastic political philosophy, he nevertheless re-
mained loyal to the proposition that with power 
comes responsibility. Spanish scholastics, in partic-
ular, stressed the constitutional nature of political 
power and its limits,98 even if Jesuits such as 
Molina, Lessius, and Suárez seem to have harbored 
stronger anti-absolutistic instincts than Dominican 
theologians such as Vitoria, Soto, and Mercado.99
The prince should keep in mind that not every-
thing that lies in his power is, at the same time, 
expedient for the republic. When the state seeks to 
regulate the market, it should proceed carefully. 
Prices should not be fixed in an arbitrary way but 
after careful consideration of several circumstan-
ces. This is the point where theological advice 
should be considered useful by the prince. He 
could request the advice of confessors, experts in 
natural and divine law, and »voices of con-
science«.100 A good example was the Portuguese 
king João III, who had shown the right way by 
establishing the »Mesa da Consciência«, a board of 
theological advisers.101 If the Church legitimated 
the jurisdictional power of the prince, he was 
expected to accept the legal order of the spiritual 
authorities. Giving and taking on both sides was 
the necessary condition to safeguard the collabo-
rative plural legal order in early modern Spain.

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